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Teleological Explanation: Surveying the Landscape 
 
 
This paper presents a novel account of teleological explanations in biology.  I outline the 
“shorthand approach” to such explanations, on which they are taken to convey implicit 
evolutionary explanations. “Selected effects” accounts of teleological explanation dominate 
recent literature, but they struggle to accommodate teleological explanations of complex 
traits built through cumulative selection. I articulate the general notion of a landscape 
explanation, which, applied to biology, explains the evolution of complex features in a 
population by citing salient features of the population’s fitness landscape. I show that such 
explanations lend themselves to a teleological shorthand. I close with remarks concerning 
when a teleological explanation of a trait is legitimate, and why teleological language strikes 
us as appropriate when we give evolutionary explanations. 
 
 
1. The Shorthand Approach 
 
Why do sparrows have wings? For flying. Why does the heart beat? In order to circulate the 
blood. Teleological explanations often strike us as apt in biological contexts. Such 
explanations purport to explain the presence of some trait in a type of organism by citing an 
effect the trait produces. Informally, they explain why a trait is there by stating what it is 
there for. In so doing, they often make use of language otherwise reserved for artefacts and 
agents: phrases like “in order to”, and terms like terms “purpose”, “goal” and “function”.  
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Philosophical responses to such explanations fall into two broad camps. One aims to bring 
teleological explanations within the scope of broader theories of scientific explanation (e.g. 
Ayala 1970, Wright 1976, Nagel 1977, Salmon 1989, Brandon 1990, Neander 1991a,b). The 
other seeks to deny such explanations scientific legitimacy (e.g. Hempel 1959, van der Steen 
1971, Ghiselin 1974, 1994, Bechtel 1989, Cummins 1975, 2002, Kramer 1984, Hanke 
2004). The motive for adopting the latter position is clear. We often give teleological 
explanations that pertain to the features of artefacts: my computer has a mouse for moving 
the cursor, my kettle has a heating element for boiling water. But these explanations work on 
the implicit presupposition that these objects have been designed with a particular purpose in 
mind. We can account for such explanations by realizing that they implicitly point to a cause 
of the feature they purport to explain: the cause is the designer’s intention that the heating 
element boil water or that the mouse move the cursor. The worry is that teleological 
explanation in biology presupposes an implicit, radical commitment to the view that 
organisms too are products of intentional design. On the assumption that there is no strange 
backward causation at work, it is hard to see how else a trait’s effects can explain why it is 
there. 
 
How can the defender of the scientific legitimacy of teleological explanations dispel such 
doubts? One promising line of thought suggests that teleological explanations, in the context 
of modern biology, serve as a shorthand for evolutionary explanations. I will call this the 
“shorthand approach”. The appeal of the shorthand approach lies in the hope that, if we can 
account for how the “longhand” evolutionary explanation allows a trait’s effects to play a 
role in explaining its current presence, we will be able to account for how our everyday 
teleological explanations of heartbeats and kidneys can be scientifically legitimate after all. 
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But the shorthand approach needs fleshing out. Important questions remain: What is the 
evolutionary longhand implied by the teleological shorthand? And how does the longhand 
legitimize the explanation of a trait’s current presence by appeal to its effects?  
 
Karen Neander (1991a,b), influenced by Larry Wright (1973, 1976), supplies a theory of 
teleology in biology that purports to answer these questions. For Neander, teleological 
explanations cite “proper functions”, where a trait’s proper function is defined as that effect 
it produces in virtue of which it was selected. Robert Cummins (2002) raises a problem for 
this “selected effects” account of teleological explanation. In the next section I argue that, 
while Cummins’s objection is not decisive, it presents a challenge to the “selected effects” 
theory serious enough to motivate a search for a different way to flesh out the shorthand 
approach. In the rest of the paper, I proceed to argue for such an alternative. I propose that 
teleological explanations work by drawing our attention to salient features of a population’s 
fitness landscape. 
 
2. The “Selected Effects” Theory 
 
2.1 Wright and Neander 
The “selected effects” (SE) theory derives from Wright’s (1973) observation that, in 
populations under natural selection, a trait can come to have what Wright calls a 
consequence etiology, whereby its current presence is explained by a type of effect its past 
tokens produced. Suppose some trait T has been selected in virtue of producing some 
advantageous effect E; and suppose that, had T not been selected, it would no longer be 
present. We can then say that T is present because it produces E. Wright makes the point 
vividly: 
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If an organ has been naturally differentially selected-for by virtue of something it 
does, we can say that the reason the organ is there is that it does that something. 
Hence we can say animals have kidneys because they eliminate metabolic wastes 
from the bloodstream; porcupines have quills because they protect them from 
predatory enemies; plants have chlorophyll because chlorophyll enables plants to 
accomplish photosynthesis; the heart beats because its beating pumps blood (L. 
Wright 1973, 159). 
 
Neander (1991a,b) provides a more rigorous formulation of this idea. Neander proposes to 
define the notion “proper function” as follows: 
 
It is a/ the proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which 
items of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and 
which caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be 
selected by natural selection (1991a, 174).1, 2 
 
Neander then claims that a teleological explanation cites an effect that is a “proper 
function”. In other words, a teleological explanation of cites an effect of the explanandum 
                                                 
1 Millikan (1984, 1989a,b, 1993) has independently developed a similar theory. I focus on Neander’s 
formulation because Neander explicitly aims to apply her notion of “function” to teleological explanation in 
biology. 
2 Neander tends to abbreviate this definition to the claim that biological functions are “effects for which traits 
were selected by natural selection” (1991a, 168). I avoid this here. The idea of a trait being “selected for its 
effect” sounds suspiciously teleological, and is easily confused with the similar-sounding causal notion of 
“selection for a trait” in a population. It is the latter, not the former, that is embodied in Sober’s (1984) 
“selection for/selection of” distinction. 
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trait that contributed to the (inclusive) fitness of its past bearers, and in virtue of which the 
explanandum trait (or its genotype, if one takes this to be the unit of selection) was selected. 
 
2.2 A digression on functions 
Neander’s approach to teleological explanation begins by defining a trait’s “proper function” 
as the effect in virtue of which it was selected. A teleological explanation is then said to 
work by citing a trait’s “proper function”. But couldn’t we say more concisely that a 
teleological explanation cites an effect in virtue of which the trait was selected? Why bring 
functions into it?  
 
For Neander, the motivation seems to be an intention that the SE theory kill two birds with 
one stone. Neander aims not only to render teleological explanation respectable, but also to 
provide us with a conceptual analysis of what “function” means in biology. There are 
reasons to doubt that Neander succeeds in hitting the second bird. If the SE theory 
accurately captured the meaning of “function” as biologists use the term, one would expect 
biologists to be cautious in attributing a function to a trait by inferring from its current 
effects. We would expect them to defer to palaeontological evidence on such questions. Yet, 
as many authors have noted (Cf. Amundson & Lauder 1994, Wouters 2003, Lewens 2004, 
Weber 2005, Griffiths in press), biologists routinely ascribe “function” while possessing 
little knowledge of the evolutionary history of the feature with which they are concerned. 
Niko Tinbergen (1963) warns against conflating questions of function with questions of 
evolutionary history in the study of behaviour: in his iconic “four whys”, these are separate 
questions.  
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But Neander’s two birds are not inseparable. The success or failure of the SE account of 
teleological explanations does not turn on whether it also supplies, as a by-product, a 
conceptual analysis of function. It is irrelevant to the concerns of this paper whether 
Neander’s notion of “proper function” captures the meaning of “function” in biology. One 
might take teleological explanations to be legitimate, and accept what the SE theory has to 
say concerning how they work, while rejecting Neander’s purported conceptual analysis. In 
this sense the two issues can be teased apart.  
 
2.3 A problem for SE 
Let us return to teleological explanations. On the SE theory, to say “the heart beats because 
beating pumps blood” is to imply that beating hearts were once selected, that this selection 
explains why animals have beating hearts today, and that this selection occurred because 
beating hearts contributed to the fitness of their bearers by pumping blood. To say that, 
“birds have wings because wing enable flight” is to say that wings were once selected, that 
this explains why today’s birds have wings, and that wings were selected because they 
contributed to fitness by enabling flight. It is an attractively simple, intuitively plausible 
view. One problem for the theory is that it fails to account for why richly teleological turns 
of phrase (like “the heart beats in order to pump blood”, or “the purpose of the heartbeat is 
to pump blood”) should strike us as appropriate. But this is not pressing, since the defender 
of the SE theory can reply that these are informal ways of citing a trait’s proper function.  
 
There is, however, a more serious problem for the theory. The SE theory commits us to the 
position that, whenever a teleological explanation like “hearts beat because beating pumps 
blood” is legitimate, that trait was once selected. A trait is “selected” when its frequency 
increases relative to actual alternatives in a population. Neander’s definition of function 
Teleological Explanation: Surveying the Landscape   
 7 
makes plain this commitment to the past occurrence of selection of the explanandum trait. 
Brandon (2006) shows how this central commitment breaks down into four claims: 
 
For instance, if the (SE) function of the red color of a flower is to attract 
pollinators, then it must be true that: (a) at one time in the history of the lineage 
in question there was variation in flower color, red being among the variants; (b) 
this variation was heritable (usually, but not always, this means that the variation 
has a genetic basis); (c) selection, in the form of pollinator discrimination, acted 
directly on flower color, not on some correlate of flower color, favoring red over 
alternative variants; and (d) this selection within the population genetic context 
of the lineage led to the form and frequency of red flowers we see in the 
descendent populations today (Brandon 2006, 268). 
 
But the commitment of the SE theory to past competition between actual variants whenever 
a teleological explanation is appropriate turns out to be rather restrictive. As Robert 
Cummins (2002) argues, such a commitment implies that the SE theory is not able to cover 
teleological explanations such as “sparrows have wings for flying”, or “humans have eyes 
for seeing”. The SE theory would take the former explanation to imply that wings were once 
selected because wings enabled flight, and would take the latter to imply that eyes were once 
selected because eyes enabled sight. Yet: 
 
To think of the modern eye or sparrow wing as itself selected is … to conjure up 
a scenario in which there is a population of sightless primates or wingless 
songbirds into which is born a sighted or winged variation whose progeny take 
over the land or air. No one, of course, really believes anything like this. Yet 
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something very like this is implied by neo-teleology—by the idea that eyes are 
there because they enable sight and wings because they enable flight (Cummins 
2002, 169). 
 
Cummins’s argument plays on a truism concerning how evolution occurs: complex traits do 
not appear all at once, with a sudden macromutation. They are produced by cumulative 
selection for small variations on existing structures (see e.g. Dawkins 1986, Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999). They may well never have been selected themselves, simply because they 
have never faced competition from actual alternatives in the population. This claim becomes 
particularly plausible when we bring to mind complex and fundamental body parts like 
bones, skin and major organs. These are not traits for which there were actual competing 
alternatives. Consider the question of why the heart beats: the actual evolution of the beating 
heart can be traced to selection of some beneficial mutation enabling the contraction of a 
tube in chordates, in a population where no hearts was present and there was no blood to 
pump (Cf. Olson 2006). Successive beneficial mutations would have been selected over the 
millennia, one by one. At no stage in this story is there selection of beating hearts in a 
population where beating hearts, by virtue of pumping blood, out-competed an alternative 
trait, such as non-beating hearts.  There was only ever selection of tiny variations on existing 
structures.  
 
Neander (1995) is aware of the cumulative nature of adaptation, but she does not see the 
damaging consequences this observation carries for her (1991a,b) articulation of the SE 
theory. Complex traits are built by cumulative selection, but this does not imply that they 
have ever themselves been selected. Indeed, this will not be the case unless actual competing 
alternative traits have existed in the population. But if these traits have never been selected 
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then, a fortiori, they have never been selected in virtue of their advantageous effects. On the 
SE picture, complex traits that have never competed with actual alternatives cannot be given 
a teleological explanation, and of course, on Neander’s definition of the term, cannot even 
have a proper function. 
 
Cummins intends his argument both as a reductio of the SE definition of function and as a 
refutation of “neo-teleology”, a term Cummins coins for the view that the theory of 
evolution allows legitimate teleological explanations. It is a mistake, Cummins argues, to 
think that “Paley questions”—which ask why a complex adaptation is present, and which 
were paradigmatic of the natural-theological tradition defended by William Paley (1802)—
can be given scientifically respectable teleological answers in light of the theory of 
evolution. Only a long-winded historical explanation will do, detailing the many 
intermediaries and contingencies in the evolutionary history of the trait. At the very least, 
Cummins concludes, we need to shelve our more ambitious teleological explanations 
concerning heartbeats, eyes, wings and so forth. If we are to offer teleological explanations 
at all, it seems we can offer them only where the explanandum trait really has competed 
against actual alternatives. It is likely, then, that most if not all canonical examples of 
everyday teleological explanations of biological features (which tend to focus precisely on 
complex features like eyes, wings and hearts) are illegitimate. 
 
2.4 Escape routes 
Perhaps the defender of the SE approach to teleology need not be too disheartened by 
Cummins’s objection. It is cannot be wholly effective as a refutation of the SE position, 
since it allows that the SE theory can account for why citing a trait’s effect can explains its 
current presence in those cases in which the trait in question has been selected at some point 
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in the course of evolution. And this criterion will plausibly be met some of the time when we 
want to give a teleological explanation of a trait’s presence. Even rather complex traits may 
have at one time faced competition from actual variants.  
 
Moreover, although evolutionary explanations appealing to the effects in virtue of which a 
feature was selected may not be able to explain why complex traits exist, they can 
presumably explain, at a more fine-grained level, why complex traits have certain properties 
rather than others. Recall Brandon’s (2006) example of the red flower. They may never have 
been selection of flowers over an alternative, but selection of red flowers over other colours 
of flower can explain why the flowers are red.  Likewise, even if there has never been 
selection of hearts over a competing alternative, selection of efficient hearts over inefficient 
hearts can explain why we have hearts that pump blood efficiently rather than inefficiently. 
Even if there has never been selection of skin over a competing alternative, selection of pale 
skin over dark skin in regions where low sunlight limits vitamin D synthesis may explain 
why Caucasians have pale skin rather than dark skin (Cf. Loomis 1967, Jablonski & Chaplin 
2000). The SE theory supplies a sense in which, in such cases, it can biologically respectable 
to say, for instance, “Caucasians have pale skin because pale skin increases vitamin D 
synthesis”. Cummins shows that an explanation citing selection of the explanandum trait 
cannot plausibly be given for the presence of organs like hearts and skin, because there has 
never been selection of hearts in a population where some individuals lacked hearts, or 
selection of skin in a population where some individuals lacked skin. But perhaps the SE 
theorist can bite this bullet, and focus only on legitimizing teleological explanations of 
small-scale, selected features like pale skin and efficient hearts. 
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But I think there is a motive for exploring an alternative escape route for the shorthand 
approach, one that involves dodging this bullet rather than biting it. Cummins is right that 
when a complex trait has been built by cumulative selection of small variations, we cannot 
assume that the trait itself has competed against actual alternatives. Indeed, in many cases 
this possibility seems remote.  But the moral I draw from this is not that teleological 
explanations of complex traits cannot be respectable. I think rather that it is precisely in 
virtue of this process of cumulative selection that teleological explanations are respectable. 
It is because hearts were built by cumulative selection that there is a sense in which they are 
there in order to pump blood. It is because wings were built by cumulative selection that 
there is a sense in which they are there to enable flight.  
 
The essence of my proposal is simple. Teleological explanations point to the effects in virtue 
of which a trait is in some sense optimal for some organism in its environment. And traits 
that are optimal are the sort of traits we should expect a process of cumulative natural 
selection to throw up, provided a number of important assumptions obtain. This, in a 
nutshell, is why citing a trait’s effects can explain its presence. The remainder of this paper 
presents this idea rather more thoroughly. In the next section, I outline the form of 
explanation at work here, which I term “landscape explanation”. I then show how a 
landscape explanation lends itself to a teleological shorthand. 
 
3. Explaining with Landscapes 
 
3.1 Zooming out 
We can appeal to selection to explain why the frequency of some trait changes over time, 
but this is not the only explanatory work the concept of selection can do. Another sort of 
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explanation appeals to selection to explain why the trait came to exist in the first place. Such 
explanations “zoom out”: they appeal to the cumulative effect of selection for beneficial 
variations on existing structures. This process builds complex traits gradually, through a 
series of intermediaries. One might suppose (as Cummins does) that answering a “Paley 
question” in this way requires detailed historical knowledge of the population in question, 
including fine-grained detail of the intermediaries that were selected. I contend that is not 
the case. Once one understands the basic process of cumulative selection, one need not give 
a longwinded story of fine-grained causal detail to answer “Paley questions”. There is a 
concise form of evolutionary explanation that does not require detailed knowledge of this 
sort. 
 
This key, I suggest, is to visualize the cumulative effects of selection as the uphill movement 
of a population towards peaks on a fitness landscape. I contend that, from this zoomed out 
perspective, the shape of the landscape can explain why certain traits were the end products 
of cumulative selection. When the landscape is reasonably smooth and reasonably constant 
over time, we do not need fine-grained knowledge of the actual trajectory taken by the 
population across the landscape, since cumulative selection will push the population to the 
same peak from any of a wide range of initial conditions and trajectories. We do not need 
contingent historical detail of specific selection processes. We need only know the locations 
of the peaks. In this section, I spell out this picture in more detail. I first spell out the general 
form of explanation that I take to be at work here. 
 
3.2 A simple case 
Consider a ball dropped onto a landscape at time t (Figure 1). It rolls around and eventually 
comes to rest in the centre at t'. Why did it come to rest here? We can answer this question 
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with a causal story that cites the initial position of 
the ball, the gravitational force acting on it, and 
the subsequent trajectory that followed as a 
causal consequence from the initial position and 
the action of gravity. But suppose we do not have 
access to such information. Suppose we do not 
know the ball’s initial position, or the trajectory it subsequently took. All we know is that it 
was dropped somewhere on the surface, and ended up in the centre. Can we still explain its 
final position?  
 
Even in this situation of relative ignorance, we can explain why the ball came to rest where 
it did. Because we know the shape of the landscape, we know that the centre is its lowest 
point, and so is the point at which the ball has least gravitational potential energy. We also 
know that the surface is reasonably smooth, so that a possible trajectory to the centre would 
have been available from almost any initial condition. On such a landscape, the ball will 
eventually settle at the centre almost regardless of its initial position and subsequent 
trajectory. It is not quite true that the ball will settle at the lowest point of the surface for any 
initial position, even on a reasonably smooth landscape like that shown in Figure 1. If the 
ball were placed right at one of the corners of this landscape, it would drop off the edge. But 
the existence of exceptional initial conditions does not invalidate our explanation when the 
ball is found to have settled in the centre. The “landscape explanation” works because a 
large range of initial conditions and subsequent trajectories will result in the ball ending up 
in the centre. Fine-grained causal knowledge of the ball’s trajectory is unnecessary.  
 
Fig. 1 
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Explanations of this general form explain an observed state of a system (in this particular 
case, a particular position for the ball) by showing that this state has a special property: it is 
the state in which the system will be found in the long run, given any of some range of 
possible initial conditions and subsequent trajectories. The explanation does not aim to trace 
the particular initial state or trajectory actually taken by the ball (i.e. the line in Fig. 1). The 
possibility of a longer, separate explanation citing this fine-grained information thus remains 
open, though it would not necessarily provide the sort of understanding we seek. The 
landscape explanation may be the more helpful answer.  
 
Do landscape explanations fit established models of scientific explanation? I do not think the 
legitimacy of the explanation in the simple ball-on-a-landscape case hangs on this question, 
but it will be helpful to settle it here. Models of explanation are now somewhat multifarious: 
landscape explanations fall within the scope of some, but not all. Because such explanations 
do not attempt to trace the physical, causal processes leading up to the final state of the 
system, they are not causal explanations on Wesley Salmon’s (1984) “Causal Mechanical” 
model. For Salmon, explanations cite local, spatiotemporally continuous causal processes 
that produced the phenomenon we want to explain. Landscape explanations fail to supply 
information of this kind. Merely stating that the centre is the lowest point on the landscape 
in Fig. 1 does not give information about the causal processes by which the ball in fact came 
to rest in the centre. A causal-mechanical explanation of the ball’s final position would cite 
the fine causal detail of the ball’s trajectory.  
 
Nevertheless, explanations of this sort have previously attracted attention in the philosophy 
of science, notably in Elliott Sober’s (1983, 1984) discussion of equilibrium explanation, 
and Kim Sterelny’s (1996) discussion of the difference between actual sequence and robust 
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Fig. 2. Conformers of 
cyclohexane (lines 
represent carbon-carbon 
bonds, vertices represent 
carbon atoms). 
process explanations. Both authors note that a causal explanation of some phenomenon need 
not cite information concerning the actual sequence of events by which it was produced. 
They observe that we can also explain by showing how the explanandum would have 
occurred given any of a range of initial conditions and causal trajectories. I suggest that 
“landscape explanations” are a special case of this general sort of explanation.  
 
James Woodward (2003, 6) argues that Sober’s equilibrium explanations are in turn merely 
a variety of causal explanation. On Woodward’s view, causal explanations answer what-if-
things-had-been-different questions: they tell us how interventions to given variables would 
have affected the explanandum. On Woodward’s view, the ball-on-a-landscape explanation 
qualifies as a form of causal explanation because it tells us something about how 
interventions would have affected the explanandum. It does not, however, show how the 
explanandum would have been different under interventions, but rather shows the opposite: 
that intervening on the initial position or subsequent path of the 
ball within certain limits would have made no difference to the 
ball’s final resting place. 
 
3.3 Energy minima 
The general notion of a landscape explanation can illuminate 
explanatory practices across the sciences. Before proceeding to 
biology, let me stress its importance in chemistry—a comparison 
between the two cases will prove fruitful later on. Take, for 
instance, the case of cyclohexane (C6H6). Cyclohexane can 
theoretically adopt a number of different conformational isomers 
(or conformers). Obvious examples include the planar 
Teleological Explanation: Surveying the Landscape   
 16 
conformation (Fig. 2, top), the “chair” conformation (middle) and the “boat” conformation 
(bottom). But in a typical sample of cyclohexane at equilibrium, one conformation is 
overwhelmingly dominant: the chair. Other forms of the molecule can only be isolated with 
extreme difficulty; many, including the boat, cannot be isolated at all. Why is the chair form 
dominant? 
 
In this case, the micro-level causal history of a given cyclohexane sample is inaccessible to 
us, so an explanation citing the initial conditions and subsequent interactions of the system 
of molecules is not an option. But we can still give an explanation. The explanation proceeds 
by showing that, of all possible conformations, the chair is the most stable. It minimizes 
torsional strain, and consequently is of particularly low energy (cf. Clayden et al. 2001). The 
laws of thermodynamics then dictate that this particularly stable conformer will dominate 
when a system of cyclohexane molecules is at equilibrium.  
 
This explanation is similar in character to the ball-on-a-landscape explanation we considered 
above. One can picture the cyclohexane molecules exploring a multidimensional potential 
energy surface, with one dimension for each degree of freedom of the molecule, on which 
each point represents a possible conformation the molecule could adopt. The chair is then 
the minimum on the surface. The tendency of actual molecules to occupy this conformation 
in preference to, say, that corresponding to the boat conformation can be explained by 
appeal to the shape of the surface (see Atkins & Friedman 2005, Ch. 8, for an introduction to 
the notion of potential energy surface, and Leventis et al. 1997 regarding the conformational 
energy surface of cyclohexane). 
 
3.4 Fitness peaks 
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How, then, might this form of explanation apply in biology? The sort of explanation at work 
in the cyclohexane example applies straightforwardly to the explanation of the conformation 
of larger molecules, including biological macromolecules such as proteins. We typically 
explain why a protein folds to adopt a particular conformation by citing the fact that the 
resultant structure corresponded to an energy minimum (eg. Bryngelson & Wolynes 1987, 
Pace et al. 1996, Leeson et al. 2000). But it seems that similar explanations are unlikely to 
be effective for complex, macroscopic traits. We cannot explain, for example, why 
mammals have eyes, simply by pointing out that completed eyes are particularly 
thermodynamically stable. This might explain why mammalian eyes don’t fall apart, and it 
might help explain how mammalian eyes develop, but it does not explain why eyes evolved 
in the first place.3 
 
There is, however, a form of explanation 
closely analogous to the explanations we 
have so far discussed that is supplied by the 
apparatus of evolutionary biology. Such 
explanations make use of Sewall Wright’s 
(1932) notion of a “fitness landscape”. An 
evolving population of organisms can be said to move around this notional landscape in a 
fashion roughly analogous to the ball on a real landscape. Note that the “fitness landscape”, 
which often enjoys a central role in expositions of the fundamental ideas of the theory of 
evolution (e.g. Dennett 1995, Dawkins 1996, Godfrey-Smith 2009, Orr 2009), is distinct 
                                                 
3 Authors such as Brian Goodwin (1994) have sought an explanation for complex traits in complex systems 
theory rather than in evolution by natural selection, and may disagree with me here. In this paper I adopt the 
reasonably orthodox neo-Darwinian line that the existence of such traits is best explained by appeal to natural 
selection. 
Fig. 3 from S. Wright (1932) 
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from the “adaptive landscape” familiar from textbooks (e.g. Futuyma 1998). On an adaptive 
landscape, mean population fitness is plotted as a continuous function of the frequency of 
alleles in a population. A population is then represented as a dot moving around the 
landscape as the alleles within the population change in frequency. By contrast, a fitness 
landscape represents the fitness of discrete individual genotypes (or, alternatively, 
phenotypes) in a given environment. Wright pictures “genotypes … packed, side by side … 
in such a way that each is surrounded by genotypes that differ by only one gene 
replacement” (S. Wright 1988, 116). The height of landscape at each discrete point shows 
the fitness of the genotype represented by that point. We can then represent a population as a 
cloud of genotypes, as shown in Wright’s original 1932 diagrams (Figures 3, 4). As 
individuals appear, reproduce and 
die, the cloud moves around the 
landscape as the genotypic 
composition of the population 
changes.  
 
What determines how close together 
two genotypes are found on the 
fitness landscape? It is the similarity of the two genotypes, as measured by the number of 
genes that would have to be changed to get from one to the other. Individual genotypes that 
differ by relatively few genes will be closer together; genotypes that differ by many genes 
will be further apart. There is a complication here: one would need far more than three 
dimensions to represent these “distances” accurately. The problem with three is that, for a 
genotype G, the number of genotypes that differ from G by, say, 100 genes is vastly larger 
than the number that differ from G by ten genes, and this number is vastly larger than the 
Fig. 4 from S. Wright (1932) 
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number that differ from G by exactly one gene. Yet a 3D landscape only allows the number 
of points at some radius from G to increase proportionally with the radius. A 3D fitness 
landscape cannot be a mathematically accurate representation of the “distances” between 
genotypes. 
 
But a mathematical model was never Wright’s intention (see S. Wright 1988). The 3D 
fitness landscape is an explanatory tool that allows us to visualize some of the salient 
features of evolutionary dynamics on multidimensional landscapes. Importantly for our 
current purposes, it enables us to envision natural selection as a hill climbing process, 
tending to result in a population clustering around local peaks, just as a ball on a landscape 
tends to roll to the lowest point in its vicinity. Imagine a population on a smooth uphill slope 
leading to a peak. The fitter, “upslope” individuals have a greater expected number of 
offspring that their “downslope” competitors; and, since offspring tend to resemble their 
parents, this will tend to result in the relative number of individual genotypes in the higher 
region increasing over time. Overall, the population as a whole will tend to shuffle gradually 
uphill. When the random appearance of fitness-enhancing mutations results in genotypes 
even higher up the slope entering the population, selection will drive the population yet 
further uphill. The cumulative effect of the selection of new mutations will be the movement 
of the population towards a peak. When the peak is reached, no further uphill movement is 
available. New mutations will be selected against, and the genotypic composition of the 
population will be relatively stable. 
 
The population may not reach the global peak: that is, the highest peak on the entire 
landscape for the environment in question. In sufficiently “rugged” landscapes, the 
population may get stuck on local peaks, separated from higher peaks by fitness “valleys”. 
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Wright (1932) makes much of this potential obstacle to adaptive evolution.4 Moreover, for 
various reasons, a population may not shuffle uphill at all. New mutations may fail to occur 
in the required direction, and in some cases frequency-dependent selection can cause a 
population to move away from a peak (see Moran 1964 for a number of examples where the 
“uphill push” fails to occur). A further complication (raised by Lewontin 1978) is that 
environments are unlikely to be wholly unchanging across any extended time interval, with 
the result that fitnesses of different genotypes—and thus the shape of the fitness landscape—
may vary significantly over evolutionary time. Yet, despite these pitfalls, the general 
observation holds. Though populations will not always move uphill, the dynamics of natural 
selection suggest they typically will. When a range of assumptions hold, including the 
reasonable smoothness of the fitness landscape, the stability of its shape over a period of 
time, the non-frequency-dependence of selection and the regular appearance of new random 
mutants, a population will tend to move upwards until it reaches a fitness peak, at which 
point, if it gets there, it will be relatively adaptive and relatively evolutionarily stable.5 
 
3.5 Explaining Evolved Features 
Let us now consider how the notion of a fitness landscape might help explain the typical 
presence of a trait in a population of organisms. Suppose you ask why trait T is present in a 
population P. Why do humans have hearts? Why do sparrows have wings?  We could give a 
fine-grained historical explanation of these phenomena. But I propose that we can also give 
another sort of explanation. In its general form, it proceeds as follows: T is present because 
                                                 
4 Kauffman & Levin (1987) further discuss the features of rugged fitness landscapes.  
5 Note that a reliable mapping of genotype to phenotype in a given environment is required for the notion of a 
fitness landscape to work. One could avoid the need for this assumption by talking of fitness landscapes 
constituted by phenotypes rather than genotypes, but I do not explore this avenue here. 
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genotypes whose phenotypes contain T represented a peak on the fitness landscape of P or 
of an ancestral population from which P is descended.  
 
Of course, for this explanation to work at all, T must actually correspond to a peak on a 
current or ancestral fitness landscape. The presence of a trait can only be explained by 
appeal to the shape of a given fitness landscape when it corresponds to a local optimum on 
that landscape. Moreover, certain assumptions must hold, viz. the assumptions which must 
obtain for hill-climbing to occur at all. These include the assumptions that the relevant 
landscape must be reasonably smooth and reasonably constant over time. The landscape 
must have been smooth enough for the peak corresponding to T to have been ascended from 
any of a wide range of initial positions. And the landscape must have been constant enough 
for the population to have had to time to ascend the peak corresponding to T from a similarly 
wide range of starting points.  
 
In the ball example, the explanation of why the ball stopped where it did cites that the place 
it stopped was a potential energy minimum. In the cyclohexane example, the explanation of 
why one particular conformer is prevalent proceeded by showing that the conformer 
represented an energy minimum on an energy surface. Now, I have suggested that we can 
explain the presence of a trait in analogous fashion: by citing that genotypes with the actual 
trait represent a fitness peak on the fitness landscape of a current population or of its 
ancestral populations, provided a range of assumptions hold. Fitness-landscape explanations 
work in much the same way as the landscape explanations we considered in §3.2 and §3.3. 
They tell us that the explanandum trait would have evolved given any of a range of initial 
conditions and causal trajectories. But they do not presuppose the occurrence of past 
selection of the explanandum trait. 
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One may wish to supplement a landscape explanation with historical detail concerning the 
evolution of the trait in question. I do not claim that a landscape explanation is ever a 
substitute for a historical explanation of the trait’s presence. But nor is a historical 
explanation a substitute for a landscape explanation. A landscape explanation offers 
understanding of a sort that a historical explanation may not be able to provide. It tells us 
that the evolution of a trait did not depend on the fine-grained details of a population’s 
trajectory across the fitness landscape, but rather depended on that trait having the property 
of corresponding to a peak. 
 
4. Teleology Revisited 
 
Explanations that make use of a fitness landscape rely on a broad principle that populations 
tend to occupy certain regions of the fitness landscape because those regions are peaks. This 
idea suggests a way in which the effects by means of which a trait contributes to fitness can 
help explain why that trait is there. By considering the fitness-enhancing effects a trait 
would have, we can infer that genotypes with that trait are likely to constitute peaks on the 
fitness landscape, much as, for instance, considering torsional strain allows us to infer that 
the chair conformation of cyclohexane is at the minimum on that molecule’s energy surface. 
Then, just as the relative energies of the conformations of cyclohexane explain why one is 
preferred, the relative heights of genotypes on the fitness landscape can explain why 
organisms in the population have evolved those genotypes through cumulative selection. 
There is thus a role for knowledge of a trait’s effects in a landscape explanation of its 
presence.  
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Moreover, in contexts where the background theory and necessary assumptions are taken for 
granted, showing that the explanandum trait corresponded to a local optimum may be all the 
information we need to explain its presence. Talk of hill climbing on fitness landscapes can 
be elided. Consider the following example, supplied by Tim Lewens (2007): 
 
Suppose a selection process is at work on some slow-running wolves. The 
wolves’ environment may be such that were these wolves to run faster, they 
would catch more deer. … It is thus legitimate to say that a particular pack of 
wolves is composed of fast runners because running fast helps wolves to catch 
deer (Lewens 2007, 55). 
 
Taken in isolation, this observation seems puzzling. How can the fact that fast running 
would be advantageous for the wolves, if only they could do it, explain why they actually 
evolved to run fast? It sounds as though natural selection is an intentional designer, 
choosing which traits to build by contemplating their hypothetical advantageousness. But 
the notion of a fitness landscape can help make sense of such cases. Because running fast 
helps wolves to catch deer, and this advantage outweighs any potential drawbacks, the claim 
that fast running corresponded to a peak on the fitness landscape for these wolves is 
plausible. The “teleological” explanation is a concise means of drawing attention to this. We 
need not go into detail about the evolutionary trajectory by which the wolves have ended up 
fast. Presumably, change occurred via selection for small increases in speed, and hence it 
would be misleading to speak of fast-running wolves being selected over slow-running 
wolves. Nevertheless, ignorance of the actual course of selection does not preclude a 
landscape explanation.  
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On the view I am proposing, a landscape explanation can lend itself to a teleological 
shorthand that cites only the advantageous effects of a trait. To say that “sparrows have 
wings because wings enable flight” is respectable because it implies the following lengthier 
explanation:  
 
Cumulative selection acting on sparrows or an ancestor of sparrows resulted in 
wings because wings corresponded to a peak on the relevant fitness landscape—
because wings enabled flight.  
 
The longhand explanation does not presuppose design, nor does it posit selection of winged 
birds over wingless birds in a historical population. Likewise, to say that “the human heart 
beats because beating circulates the blood” is respectable because it implies the following 
longhand:  
 
Cumulative selection acting on humans or an ancestor of humans resulted in 
beating hearts because beating hearts corresponded to a peak on the relevant fitness 
landscape—because beating hearts circulate the blood.  
 
To underline the point, this landscape explanation does not presuppose historical selection 
for beating hearts over non-beating hearts. The teleological shorthand is rather more concise 
than the evolutionary longhand. I suggest that there is no harm in using this shorthand, if we 
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5.1 The big picture 
The “selected effects” approach to teleology gets something right: it is motivated by a 
realization that the process of natural selection works in such a way as to make teleological 
explanations respectable. This fundamental insight in part explains, I suspect, why the view 
has garnered such widespread support within both biology and philosophy. But, as 
Cummins (2002) notes, explicit formulations of the SE theory cannot cover teleological 
explanations of complex traits. SE theories focus on why a trait was selected, yet adaptation, 
generally speaking, occurs by cumulative selection. One should not imagine that complex 
traits (like wings, eyes and hearts) have achieved and maintained their current prevalence by 
out-competing actual alternatives. When we ask why birds have wings or why hearts beat, 
the answer cannot be that winged birds out-competed wingless birds, or that beating hearts 
out-competed non-beating hearts. Rather, complex traits result from selection for small 
variations on existing structures.  
 
Though Cummins hopes to precipitate the demise of “neo-teleology”, I have drawn a 
different moral from his observation. Cumulative selection does not just throw up complex 
traits at random, irrespective of their contribution to fitness. On the contrary, when we 
“zoom out” to visualize evolution over extended periods of evolutionary time, we can 
envision cumulative selection as a process that tends to push populations uphill on a fitness 
landscape, the topography of which is determined by the population’s environment. With 
some assumptions about the smoothness and constancy of that landscape over the time 
required for cumulative selection, we can start to construct explanations for why certain 
traits have been built by the process. We can explain the evolution of a trait by pointing out 
that genotypes with that trait sit atop peaks on the fitness landscape. I have argued that this 
form of explanation lends itself to a teleological shorthand in which the relevant 
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assumptions are implicit. If a trait T, by virtue of its effect E, makes a contribution to fitness 
which is such that the population sits atop a peak on the fitness landscape, we can correctly 
give a shorthand explanation that simply says, “T is there because it produces E.”  
 
This account of teleological explanation is in some sense “etiological”. Like the SE theory, 
it yields the result that teleological explanations in biology are legitimate, without any 
presupposition of backward causation or intentional design, because they imply an 
evolutionary explanation. But I have argued that the sort of evolutionary explanation that 
lends itself to a teleological shorthand in biology is more “zoomed out” than the SE theory 
suggests. It does not cite selection for the explanandum trait. It appeals instead to the “big 
picture”: the population’s fitness landscape.  
 
I want to close by considering how the theory of teleological explanation sketched in this 
paper can provide tentative answers to two further questions regarding the applicability of 
teleological explanation in biology. By thinking of teleological explanations as abbreviated 
landscape explanations, we can, I think, suggest criteria for when a teleological explanation 
of a trait is biologically respectable, and suggest a reason why teleological language seems 
appropriate when we explain a trait’s presence by appeal to its effects.  
 
5.2 When a teleological explanation is legitimate 
Whenever philosophers seek to account for teleological explanations, the threat of a 
sceptical reply lurks in the background: they are not genuine explanations at all! After all, it 
is not obvious from their surface form that teleological explanations in biology are anything 
more than a relic from Paley’s natural theology, a careless consequence of our inclination to 
see organisms as if they were intentionally designed when they are not. There is plausibility 
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in the rebuttal that runs: “You can’t explain why something is there just by saying what it 
does! You’d have to be a Creationist to think such a thing!” Philosophers from Carl Hempel 
(1959) to Robert Cummins (2002) have sought to expose teleological explanations as shaky 
edifices built on false assumptions, while biologists from Michael Ghiselin (1974) to David 
Hanke (2004) have sought to expunge teleological explanations from their field (it is, in 
Hanke’s eyes, “the explanation that bedevils biology”).Such criticisms cannot be taken 
lightly. For those who seek to defend “neo-teleology” in biology, the project is to elucidate 
when and why citing a trait’s effect can help explain its presence. The goal is to make the 
sceptical reply look rather less plausible that it does at first glance. 
 
I have aimed to meet this challenge. According to the “landscape” account, teleological 
explanations imply a form of explanation that appeals to the structure of a population’s 
fitness landscape. The model makes clear the situations in which teleological explanations 
of a trait are appropriate: they work when the conditions required for the longhand 
landscape explanation are met. “Hill climbing” must have occurred by cumulative selection 
of beneficial mutations, and the relevant fitness landscape on which the hill climbing 
occurred must have been reasonably constant and reasonably smooth, such that the peak 
could have been reached from any of a wide range of starting points and trajectories. 
Whether these conditions have been met in a particular case is an empirical matter. 
Landscape explanations demand a rich background of assumptions. If it turns out that these 
assumptions do not hold in a particular case, a teleological explanation will be spurious in 
that case. How often teleological explanations are legitimate in biology will depend on how 
often these assumptions hold. 
  
5.3 Why teleological language strikes us as appropriate 
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I noted at the start of this paper that teleological explanations often do not simply state a 
trait’s effects. They tend to make use of explicitly teleological terminology. Hearts beat in 
order to pump blood. Wings are for flying: flying is their purpose. I pointed out that we 
typically associate this sort of language with artefacts and agents. Defenders of a shorthand 
approach to teleological explanations aim to dispel a worry that arises from this, viz. the 
worry that teleological explanations presuppose intentional design. But this still leaves an 
unanswered question: if organisms are not designed artefacts, in virtue of what is 
teleological language appropriate? On John Maynard Smith’s (1990) view, it is merely a 
matter of being concise. Phrases like “in order to” are all part of the effort to convey an 
evolutionary explanation as compactly as possible. But compare, “hearts beat in order to 
pump blood” with, “hearts beat because beating pumps blood”. The first is no more concise 
for inserting a teleological “in order to”. What tempts us to use such terms? I want to close 
by suggesting a speculative answer. 
 
A ball dropped into a crater rolls around and tends to settle in the centre. Is it unreasonable 
to think of the ball as though it were “seeking out” the point of lowest potential energy? In 
this case, maybe it is a little far fetched. The ball is changing position, but not by virtue of 
any internal changes. But on the sort of energy surface we considered in the case of 
cyclohexane (Section 3.2), there is a difference: now the points on the landscape do not 
simply correspond to different energies a molecule could have without exhibiting any 
change in form, but rather correspond to different forms a molecule could adopt. Thus, 
trajectories of a system of molecules across the energy landscape can be visualized as 
molecular rearrangements. And as we saw in Section 3.2, cyclohexane molecules tend to 
arrange themselves in such a way as to ensure minimum energy and maximum stability. 
Now, I think, we are much closer to apparent intentional “seeking out” behaviour. It is as 
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though the molecules are organizing themselves. An evolving system of molecules settling 
on a preferred conformation behaves, to our eyes, as though striving towards the lowest 
energy state.  
 
This conjecture entails a prediction: that, when chemists talk about molecules rearranging 
from a higher energy to a lower energy state, they should find it natural to use teleological 
language. And they do—particularly in pedagogical explanatory contexts. A standard 
undergraduate textbook, for example, tells us that "alkyl migrations occur in order to make a 
carbocation more stable” (Clayden et al. 2001, 983). Teleological language provides a basic 
heuristic framework for questions and explanations. For instance: 
 
You now know that carbocations rearrange by alkyl shifts to get as stable as they 
can be—but this carbocation is already tertiary, and there is no ring strain, so 
why should it rearrange? (Clayden et al. 2001, 984). 
  
One could cite many more examples. A recent empirical study of teleological explanations 
in chemistry teaching (Talanquer 2007) concludes that: 
 
The occurrence of teleological explanations is tightly linked to the existence of a 
rule, principle, or law that governs the behaviour of the system, and that 
explicitly or implicitly implies the minimisation or maximisation of some 
intrinsic property (e.g., total energy, entropy, free energy). This law or principle 
tends to provide a sense of preferred direction in the evolution of a 
transformation (Talanquer 2007, 8). 
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In a nutshell, the position I have defended in this paper is that teleological explanation in 
biology works in much the same way. Because evolving populations tend to shuffle uphill 
on a fitness landscape, we can explain why they evolve certain features by pointing out that 
organisms with certain traits occupy peaks on the landscape. I want to end by speculating 
that, because evolving populations tend to move towards peaks, we are inclined to envision 
them as though evolving “in order to” reach a peak. Just as cations rearrange “in order to” 
get to the most stable state, we evolved eyes “in order to” be able to see, and birds evolved 
wings “in order to” to be able to fly. Landscape explanations naturally lend themselves to 
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